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ABSTRACT 
 
 
It is only recently that panpsychism has emerged as a viable position in philosophy of mind and 
metaphysics.  As such, the exploration and defense of it is not yet on par with some competing 
views.  The current project is a step towards a remedy to this unfortunate state of affairs. It 
concerns one of the most important objections to the view, which I label the ‘mind-dust’ 
objection in homage to William James.  It is essentially the conceptual difficulty of how proto-
experiential being at the micro-level is supposed to ‘sum’ in a way that forms the consciousness 
with which we are intimately aware.  I argue that the objection is more forceful than some 
suppose, and attempt to explicate a way around it.  A possible route to circumvent the problem, I 
explain, is to develop a suggestion made by Grover Maxwell almost forty years ago.  The insight 
is to conceive of proto-experiences not as particles or bits but as fields of influence.  The end 
result is a position that looks in many ways similar to the epistemic neutral monism of Bertrand 
Russell, but is also a novel version of panpsychism.  The suggestion is simply this: it might be 
the case that we should think of the world as inherently and ontologically qualitative in nature.  I 
call this resultant position panqualiaism and hope that it represents a step forward.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“I place no extreme obligation of attentiveness on my readers; I hope instead for 
those who read as I do, seeking what they can learn from, make use of, transform 
for their own purposes. Much as they wanted to be understood accurately, the 
philosophers of the past would have preferred this response, I think, to having 
their views meticulously and sympathetically stated in all parts and relations. The 
respect they paid their predecessors was philosophy, not scholarship.” ⎯ Robert 
Nozick, Philosophical Explanations1  
 
 
The protagonist of this tale is panpsychism.  She is not only a proposed answer to the mind-body 
problem, but a structural metaphysic that guides our inquiry into the nature of reality.  The belief 
that lies at the heart of panpsychism, that experience is in some way ubiquitous, has been around 
for a long time.  An argument can be made for Aristotle holding a similar intuition, but it at least 
traces back to Spinoza.2  The contemporary literature, however, is not so respecting of such a 
view.  Opinions usually range from mere indifference to accusations of lunacy. Current 
unpopularity, though, is no exclusionary criterion, and especially not with regards to a position 
that has a rich historical grounding.  
 Every good story needs an antagonist.  Like the protagonist, it is not the usual person but 
an idea.  The antagonist at the heart of my inquiries has several different labels, such as the 
‘grain problem’3 or ‘combination problem’4.  I refer to it as the ‘mind-dust objection’ to pay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nozick (1981), p. 8. 
2 I know of no way to comprehend Aristotle’s conception of active mind as the intelligibility of the world itself (or 
as “a positive state like light” that endures eternally) other than by relating it to this intuition. To explain briefly, 
mind has the potential to become all things because experiential being or ‘understanding’ pervades all of reality. I’ll 
return to this point later. See the De Anima, 430a15-25.  
3 Maxwell, (1978), 351.  
4 Chalmers, (2010), 136.  
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homage to William James, perhaps its most forceful champion.5  It is a conceptual problem that 
arises when one holds two basic premises: (1) our experience is or at least appears to be unified, 
smooth, and not fragmented; (2) there are simpler entities that compose our experience.  The 
issue, then, is the conceptual difficulty of how something so apparently unified could actually be 
a non-unified compound.  It has at least two formulations, being a problem for both identity 
theories and panpsychisms.  The question for identity theorists is: how can the combined electro-
chemical firing of neuronal and glial cells in the brain produce conscious experience that appears 
unified to the experiencer? The corollary question for panpsychists is: how could micro or proto 
experiential phenomena sum to form the macro-level unified experiences with which we are 
normally acquainted?  
 Grover Maxwell provided the beginnings of a solution more than thirty years ago.  In 
“Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity” he takes a stab at his identity theory’s supposed 
‘grain problem’.6 His answer to the problem is twofold, containing both a negative and positive 
proposal.  The negative proposal begins with a simple observation, made by Bertrand Russell7 
before him and Daniel Stoljar8 since: our knowledge of the ‘physical’ is only rudimentary, as we 
are mostly (or completely) ignorant of its intrinsic nature and instead only have knowledge of its 
structural or dispositional properties.   
 Maxwell suggests that the ‘grain’ or ‘mind-dust’ problem results from our ignorance of 
the physical.  We simply do not know enough about it to assert that it is impossible for mental 
states to just be physical states.  The positive proposal pushes the observation further: 
Even within the bounds of present physical theory, we might consider a fanciful 
but logically coherent possibility. Fields-electrical, magnetic, or gravitational-and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 James, (1890), 145-182.  
6 Maxwell, (1978), 351.  
7 Russell, (1927), 390.  
8 Stoljar, (2006b), 170.  
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fluctuations in fields are, as far as their structures are concerned, viable 
candidates for identification with (some kinds of) mental states or mental events.9 
 
Identity theory is thus quite adaptable, since the kind of physical event need not be specified in 
order for the identity relation to hold. 
 Maxwell does not linger upon his suggestion of considering ‘fields’ for long.   It seems 
he merely wanted to show that there are alternatives to the standard brain-event model of 
identification.  I, however, see more merit in the idea.  Though Maxwell offers up the idea in the 
hopes of finding a solution for the identity theorist’s problem, I submit that it can be manipulated 
to work for the panpsychist as well.  My suggestion, derived from Maxwell’s, is simple: if the 
assumption that micro or proto experiential entities behave in the same way that physical entities 
do (or that physical entities essentially or always behave as particles) is abandoned, then the 
mind-dust objection loses much of its force.  This is because the objection’s power is rooted in 
the common conception of how physical compounds operate: as ‘bits’ or ‘atoms’.  If experiential 
being both (a) exists as something more akin to fields than particles and (b) a form of 
panpsychism can be outlined that is able to accept such a thing, then panpsychism may yet 
escape the mind-dust objection.10   
 My overall project is an attempt to further explain and defend both (a) and (b).  It begins 
with an explanation of how I understand panpsychism in Chapter I.  Chapter II provides a quick 
overview of some positions that influence my own, and acknowledges what I borrow from them.  
Chapter III lays out the mind-dust objection as explained by both James and some contemporary 
authors.  Chapter IV is an historical reconstruction of Bertrand Russell’s neutral monism, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Maxwell, (1978), 351.  
10 I do not yet want to comment on whether or not experiential properties are the intrinsic properties of physical 
things, for the panpsychist does not necessarily need to hold this. If they are, then one would need to show that 
physical entities really behave as fields instead of atoms. If they are not, then an argument not dependent upon 
physical theory would be needed.  
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provides the framework for the version of panpsychism I develop.  In Chapter V I develop a 
novel version of panpsychism based upon Maxwell’s suggestion.  In Chapter VI, I explain why 
my view circumvents the mind-dust objection.  Chapter VI, and the whole project, concludes 
with some remarks about the pros and cons of my position.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
The immediate obstacle to the goal of defending (a) and (b) is the subject of this first chapter. 
The minimal commitments for holding panpsychism must first be elucidated before any 
adventurous claims are undertaken.  The existence of many different versions of panpsychism 
suggests that I cannot simply rely on one author’s take.11 My task is instead to find the most 
basic commonalities between the views and eliminate all but the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for something to carry the label ‘panpsychism’.  In the next section, I state and 
explain three commitments that I argue are the minimal commitments of any panpsychism. 
 Without further ado, my list of minimal commitments and what I mean by them are as 
follows: 
1. Monism is true. 
2. There is a symmetrical relationship between the experiential and non-experiential. 
3. Experiential being is ubiquitous.  
 
 
§ 1  Monism 
The minimal panpsychist is a monist.  I understand monism to mean the following: there is some 
level of reality x such that all things existing at x are the same kind of thing.  If one is committed 
to a metaphysically fundamental level of reality, x may obtain at the fundamental level or one 
higher up the ladder of complexity.  Even if one does not accept the notion of a fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For instance, Galen Strawson (2006b) delineates at least four different kinds of panpsychism that one might hold.   
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level or ‘ultimates’ (understood as entities which ultimately compose everything in existence), 
one may still be a monist as long as x obtains at some level.  
 The following question immediately arises: Does the kind of monism matter?  I think that 
it does, and so will provide an example to show why. Though there are other kinds of monism, I 
am concerned with the two types most easily able to support panpsychism: neutral and ‘both’ 
monism.  I am using ‘both monism’ to refer to the position that Strawson calls “Equal-Status 
Fundamental-Duality Monism” for brevity’s sake.  
 A neutral monism similar to the type described by Bertrand Russell is what I have in 
mind.12  Although in Chapter IV I provide an alternative reading of Russell’s neutral monism, I 
will here present the usual take. The basic picture is simply that whatever ultimately composes 
reality has a neutral nature in and of itself, and can therefore be either physical or mental. 
Something more than a one-sentence sketch is needed for clarity’s sake, however.  There is 
strong evidence that Russell did not understand his view as a neutral monism in his later work, 
but historical scholarship is not my primary concern here.13  I thus restrict my discussion to the 
admirably lucid account of neutral monism given in The Analysis of Matter.  
 Chapter XXXVII, entitled “Physics and Neutral Monism”, is the culmination of Russell’s 
analysis of physics and what it means for our understanding of the world.  He acknowledges 
there that some aspects of his view give off the air of idealism whereas others have a hint of 
materialism, but makes the case that it differs from both in important respects: 
Both materialism and idealism have been guilty, unconsciously and in spite of 
explicit disavowals, of a confusion in their imaginative picture of matter.  They 
have thought of the matter in the external world as being represented by their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I focus upon Bertrand Russell because he is probably the most often cited in the literature on panpsychism.  Most 
authors with whom I am familiar indicate Russell as the source for their understanding of neutral monism.  See 
Chalmers (2010), Strawson (2006a), and Stoljar (2006a).  
13 For those interested in this historical debate, I recommend Landini (2011), pp. 289-305.  
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percepts when they see and touch, whereas these percepts are really part of the 
matter of the percipient’s brain.14 
 
Russell is here accusing both idealists and materialists of a philosophical error rooted in a 
misunderstanding about perception.  The point is that those inclined towards both materialism 
and idealism mistakenly assume that the representations we have of matter accurately portray its 
nature in and of itself.  There is at least one important implication if Russell is correct.  If the 
assumption that Russell pinpoints is done away with, we are left with the conclusion that we are 
deeply ignorant with regards to the actual nature of the material world.  
 The specific mistake of both the materialist and idealist is to think of matter as billiard-
ball type little bits.15  The advent of both quantum and relativistic physics suggests to Russell 
that we must give up this antiquated view of matter.  He instead proposes that we consider events 
to be the fundamental constituents of the world.  Since there is no prima facie reason to suppose 
that events cannot sometimes be mental in nature, then our world that seems to be mainly 
composed of physical events may also contain mental events.  The picture then, to simplify, is 
just that: reality is composed of events, with some being mental in nature and some being 
physical.16   
 I wish to contrast neutral monism with what I term ‘both’ monism, but there are many 
similarities between them.17 The ‘both’ monist takes seriously Russell’s charge that our portrait 
of reality is often unimaginative.  It arguably takes it more seriously than neutral monism, as it 
revises not only our conception of what physics is but also pushes the boundaries of metaphysics.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Russell, (1927), 382.  
15 For a good discussion of what recognizing this point means, see Strawson (1999).  
16 I mean the term ‘physical’ in the same way as Stoljar (2001) describes: as having two conceptions.  I discuss the 
details and implications of this in Chapter II.  
17 Strawson (2006b) draws inspiration from Spinoza when writing about ‘both’ monism.  For a magnificent 
historical discussion on the matter see Jonathan Bennett (2001), pp. 112-121.  Essentially, he interprets Spinoza as a 
property/concept dualist where both properties/concepts (thought and extension) obtain in a single substance 
(‘Nature’ or ‘God’).  
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 The difference between them is straightforward: while neutral monism posits ultimates 
that can be either experiential or non-experiential, both monism holds that ultimates are both 
experiential and non-experiential.  It is vital to note that the difference is specifically concerned 
with intrinsic natures.  A neutral monist could conceivably hold, for example, that the ultimates 
that compose our world are events and that all of them are both experiential and non-experiential.  
This would probably work out in many ways the same as a both monism. The deciding factor 
between them then is a question about fundamental metaphysics, namely: can ultimates be said 
to have a dual nature, or must they be in some sense neutral?  
 An answer to the question over what kind of monist to be, then, is essential for a fully 
worked out panpsychism.  It is not necessary to pick between the two I have discussed here, even 
though most versions do.  My point here is merely to show that specifying what exactly one 
means by ‘monism’ cannot be left undone.  It is also to note that competing versions of 
panpsychism may appear different but build upon the same kinds of assumptions.  
 
§ 2   Symmetry 
The second commitment to symmetry requires a bit more explanation, as many will find it the 
most contentious.  I must first give a satisfactory account of what I mean by the terms 
“experiential” and “non-experiential”.  One way to accomplish this involves explaining what is 
meant by non-experiential and then showing that the experiential is what the non-experiential is 
not.  This move is no doubt motivated by the current trend of taking physicalism as a default 
position.  It is counterintuitive, however, because it begins by assuming things foreign to us, as 
we seemingly have no direct apprehension of non-experiential things.  Many have denied this 
	   	   	  9 
claim, but many have also supported it. I cannot here argue for it, but instead merely use it as a 
starting point.18  
 Before beginning the discussion of experiential and non-experiential, I cannot help but 
give a reason for not using the more common terms “mental/conscious” and “physical/material”.  
Essentially, the vagueness associated with these terms worries me.  There is always the concern 
that they pick out things that I do not want them to.  For instance, the vagueness of the term 
“physical” makes it possible that experiences are physical given an object-based conception of 
the physical (see footnote 15).  While this might be true, it does not help my purpose.  I take 
seriously the idea that unclear terms might be at the root of many problems and so feel deeply 
uneasy about such cases.  There is of course a good chance that my preferred distinction fares no 
better or worse, but I’ll accept the risk.  
 While I cannot provide a list of the qualities that exhaustively describes the character of 
experience, I do mean the term to capture an extensive range.  Galen Strawson states the 
sentiment well in Mental Reality: 
When people talk of experience, they often have sensations and perceptions 
primarily in mind.  But thinking a thought or suddenly remembering something or 
realizing that the interval between the perfect squares increases by 2 is as much of 
an experience as feeling pain when one has burnt one’s finger or seeing a raven 
flying low over bracken.  So I will not speak of thoughts or experiences, opposing 
them in the way that some do. Episodes of conscious thought are experiential 
episodes.  Experience is as much cognitive as sensory. It includes everything a bat 
or a newborn baby can feel, and everything a great mathematician can experience 
in thinking.19 
 
I find this description to be essentially correct, as abstract thought about logic is just as much an 
experience as finding furniture in the dark with one’s tibia.  This, however, has so far been only a 
discussion of what kinds of experiences one may have.  There is also the matter of what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Strawson, in the introduction to Real Materialism and Other Essays (2008), gives a short discussion of this point.  
19 Strawson, (1994), 3.  
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experience itself is like. This question, I think, is one of the most important for the panpsychist to 
answer: What is the core nature of all experience and not just our own?  What one holds to be the 
essential character of all experience will determine the structure of one’s panpsychism.20 
 Although it doesn’t even come close to exhausting the list of the characteristics of 
experience, I’ll stick with just one: experiences at the human level are subjective.  It is a 
necessary but possibly not sufficient condition for something to be experiential to humans.21 
Subjectivity is at least one of the characteristics that make experience unique.  It also seems to be 
fairly accepted (at least among non-reductivists) that it is indeed a characteristic of experience. It 
additionally has the virtue of being basic enough to apply to all types of experiences that one can 
have.   
 What I mean by subjective is captured by Thomas Nagel when he says that, “A feature of 
experience is subjective if it can in principle be fully understood from one type of point of view: 
that of a being like the one having the experience, or at least like it in the relative modality.”22  
This is the so-called ‘what-it’s-like’ characteristic of experience; meaning that for any given 
experiential state n, there is something it is like to be in n.  This subjectivity cannot in principle 
be captured by a third-person description.  
 Non-experiential, then, may tentatively refer to all things that do not have a subjective 
component. This could just pick out what is normally meant by ‘physical’, or could include 
more. What it actually does end up referencing is not as important as the following point though. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For instance, one might hold that qualia are the most fundamental experiential phenomena from which the other 
aspects (such as intentionality, subjectivity, etc.) derive. This position might be more accurately labeled as a 
panqualiaism, which would differentiate it from other possibilities such as pansubjectivism. The traditional label of 
panpsychism might therefore best be reserved for the view that these separate aspects of experience come as a 
package deal, meaning that they are separable in thought but not ontologically.  
21 As noted in footnote 17, one might hold that what truly makes experience unique are qualia and that subjectivity 
emerges from them at higher levels of reality.  This is highly speculative and far beyond the scope of the current 
paper, though I plan to give it some thought in the future. For my purposes here, I limit myself to talking about the 
character of the type of experience we are most intimately aware of: our own.  
22 Nagel, (1979), 188. 
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The scope of things that ‘non-experiential’ refers to will shrink if more conditions are added, but 
it cannot shrink to emptiness. If it does, then idealism is true and the panpsychist’s position is 
defeated.  This is of course possible, but outside of my concern. Once again, the goal in this 
section is to show what the panpsychist needs to say instead of arguing for the view. She (the 
panpsychist) needs to hold that neither the experiential nor the non-experiential category is 
empty.  
 Claiming that the two categories are not empty is, however, not enough.  The minimal 
panpsychist must hold that the relationship between the two categories be symmetrical, which is 
my way of saying that one cannot be explained in terms of the other.  This is not merely an 
epistemic claim about the limits of our ability to understand the two.  The epistemic limit is in 
place because it is in principle impossible to explain one in terms of the other, due to them being 
metaphysically distinct.  Their natures are such that there is no level of reality where they can be 
said to be metaphysically identical.  
 Both idealism and physicalism23 are ruled out by this commitment, as they hold that at 
some level one category is explained in terms of or composed of the things in the other.  And 
traditional dualisms are excluded by commitment (1).  How, then, should one understand such a 
view that defies obvious classification? There seems to be a sense in which panpsychism (at least 
the minimal variety) has to be some kind of dualistic monism that carves a middle path in 
between the other options. Deciding what kind of monism fits this requirement is key. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Galen Strawson would not agree that physicalism is ruled out.  He points out in several places that we have no 
reason to believe that physical things are necessarily non-experiential, mainly due to our profound ignorance of their 
intrinsic nature.  I have no problem with this. I simply do not see why he insists upon calling his position a 
physicalism.  I find that almost everyone else who claims to be a physicalist wants to deny the possibility of 
fundamental mentality. This is, I think, one of the foundational claims of physicalism that is often not made explicit. 
In any case, the decision is the physicalist’s on whether or not to accept a principle of ‘no fundamental mentality’. If 
they accept such a principle, most versions of panpsychism would be ruled out. If they do not accept it, then 
panpsychism may be compatible with their view. My position on this is opposed to Jonathan Dorsey’s (2011), and it 
is also discussed in Stoljar (2006a).  
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 Something else is ruled out by this commitment that deserves to be mentioned.  A 
fundamental symmetry directly implies non-emergence. If the symmetrical relationship holds 
down to the most fundamental level of reality, then there is no chance of the experiential 
emerging from the non-experiential or vice versa. This will of course need to be justified by the 
minimal panpsychist by arguing against both brute and epistemic emergence.  
 I understand brute or metaphysical emergence to be the process of a novel entity 
emerging from a complex system that is metaphysically distinct from the system that gives rise 
to it.  I agree with Strawson that this would amount to allowing magic into our philosophical 
picture of the world, mainly because it rules out nothing.24  If new properties or things could 
emerge metaphysically out of any sufficiently complex system, then we would have no way of 
understanding these emergences and allow miracles into our worldview.  Our understanding of 
the world at present, both philosophically and scientifically, gives us little reason to propose that 
such miracles obtain.  Even if it turns out that brute emergence does occur, it does us no good to 
begin under the assumption that it does.  We should only accept such a thing in the face of a 
genuinely impassible epistemic barrier; otherwise, it is tantamount to admitting defeat.  
 It is important to note that I am here not attempting to refute through argument brute 
emergence.  I am merely giving what I think are reasons to set it aside as an unthreatening 
possibility, which could be used by anyone and not just a panpsychist.  What the minimal 
panpsychist will have to reject more convincingly is the idea of epistemic emergence.  While it 
seems unlikely that the miraculous metaphysical emergence of the experiential from the non-
experiential or vice-versa is a threatening explanation for the panpsychist, the idea that the 
experiential emerges from the non-experiential and we are just ignorant of how seems to put the 
position in jeopardy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Strawson, (2006a), 18.  
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 Once again, the symmetry between the experiential and non-experiential needs to hold at 
all levels in which they both obtain.  The possibility that our limited faculties fool us into 
thinking that one cannot come from the other is perhaps the panpsychist’s most serious threat.  
She needs to demonstrate that we know enough about the experiential and non-experiential to 
reasonably eliminate such a possibility, and thereby fortify commitment (2).   
 
§ 3   Ubiquity 
The term panpsychism itself implies a principle of ubiquity.  Such a principle is the 
manifestation of the intuition that experience in some way pervades the world, and has been 
around for a long time. It is the simplest of my minimal commitments and also what opponents 
find most unpalatable. I will state my ubiquity principle as the following: there is at least one 
level of reality n such that all things existing at n are in some way experiential. This leaves open 
the possibility that there are levels of reality where experiential being does not obtain, which the 
symmetry principle does not rule out.  The non-existence of experience at one level does not 
directly imply that it can be explained in non-experiential terms, as there could always be a more 
fundamental level where experiential being does obtain.  
 Some may consider my version of the ubiquity principle to be too weak.  It certainly 
might be that a stronger one is necessary for the view to work.  Once again, though, the goal here 
is only to unearth minimal commitments.  Even in its weakest form, the ubiquity principle 
separates panpsychism from other options and is perhaps its most distinctive characteristic.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
The position outlined in Chapter I is what I am referring to when the terms ‘panpsychism’ or 
‘minimal panpsychism’ crop up in the remainder of the project.  It is important, however, to 
discuss how my take on the view compares with its competitors.  I also think it respectful to 
acknowledge borrowed ideas. In this Section I briefly consider panpsychism and other relevant 
insights as different authors have written about them.  The analysis is not extensive, but only 
covers the essential points of relevance. The exposition is restricted to five influential 
philosophers relative to my thoughts: Galen Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Grover Maxwell, Daniel 
Stoljar, and Aristotle.  Though he certainly deserves a place in this list, I purposefully leave out 
Bertrand Russell.  This is because the discussion of his work is important enough to warrant an 
entire chapter devoted to it.  
 The ordering of my list is purposive in that it indicates the philosophers’ strength of 
allegiance with panpsychism.  Strawson not only heartily adopts it, but blasphemously argues 
that any realistic physicalist must as well. Nagel argues for something like it in several places, 
but usually remains neutral.25 Maxwell ultimately vies for a physicalist identity theory, but his 
specific version has interesting parallels with Strawson’s position.  Stoljar rejects panpsychism, 
though I include him because his work on physicalism greatly helps the overall debate. The 
curveball is Aristotle, and I save it for my last pitch.  I do not intend to make an interpretative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Nagel has the rare ability to provide masterful discussion of views without actually labeling himself.  He comes 
closest to positively arguing for panpsychism, as far as I know, in his (1979) and (1986).  Most of my discussion 
pulls from these two texts. 
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claim about how best to view Aristotle’s conception of mind. Instead, I point out that some of the 
insights and arguments that lead one toward panpsychism date to him.  The chapter ends with 
some summarizing comments on which aspects of the discussed views I borrow. 
 
§ 1   Strawson 
Galen Strawson has traveled further down the road that leads to a fully worked-out panpsychism 
than most.  In the reply to commentators of “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails 
Panpsychism”, he lists and briefly explains 41 metaphysical and epistemic theses that constitute 
the framework of his view.26  I take this as being the closest to a definitive statement of his view 
that he has given. I seek only to describe the basic picture and theses I directly use, and so will 
not come close to covering them all.  
 The first paragraph of “Realistic Monism” states the position in a nutshell: 
 
I take physicalism to be the view that every real, concrete phenomenon in the 
universe is… physical.  It is a view about the actual universe, and I am going to 
assume that it is true. For the purposes of this paper I will equate ‘concrete’ with 
‘spatio-temporally (or at least temporally) located’, and I will use ‘phenomenon’ 
as a completely general word for any sort of existent. Plainly all mental goings on 
are concrete phenomena.27 
 
To quickly summarize, physicalism (and thus monism) is assumed true and therefore mental 
events are physical.  Strawson, however, does not mean what most other physicalists do by this 
claim.   
 To illustrate Strawson’s attempt at building a new kind of physicalism, I offer some of his 
theses construed as an argument: 
 [1]   There is a fundamental sense in which there is only one kind of stuff in reality 
 
 [3]   There is experiential reality or being 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Strawson (2006b), 222-223.  
27 Strawson (2008), 3.  
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 [6]   There is physical reality or being 
 
 [7]   All reality is either experiential or physical 
 
 [8]   There is only one kind of stuff. It has experiential reality and physical reality             
         and no other kind of reality 
 
 [17] There is only physical reality28 
 
These theses are aided by others, but they are a good representative sample of where Strawson 
intends to go.  He lists a number of conclusions that can be drawn from them: 
 [18]  All experiential being is physical being (Experiential Physicalism) 
 
 [19]  All physical being involves experiential being (Weak Panpsychism) 
 
 [20]  All physical being is experiential being (Pure Panpsychism) 
 
 [21]  At least some ultimates are experience-involving (Micropsychism) 
 
 [36]  Reality is substantially single. All reality is experiential and all reality is non- 
          experiential.  Experiential and non-experiential being exist in such a way that   
          neither can be said to be based in or realized by or in any way asymmetrically  
          dependent on the other. (Equal-Status Fundamental-Duality Monism)29 
 
It is not clear to me that Strawson aligns definitively with any one of these positions.  He 
expresses a fondness for [36], but only comments that it “may very well be a truth beyond our 
understanding” instead of arguing for it directly.   
 For my part, I do not think that Strawson’s goal was ever to reveal the truth of one option 
and ipso facto deny the others.  Instead, he seems only to urge that some form of panpsychism 
must be correct while leaving it up to future generations to decide which one.  His purpose for 
listing all the possibilities he can conceive of is twofold, and the same as mine: to clarify what 
sort of implications the term ‘panpsychism’ might have and to find a way to differentiate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Strawson (2006b), 222.  
29 Ibid, p. 222. I have kept Strawson’s enumeration intact for referential purposes.  
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between authors who all label themselves panpsychists. I often find his labels helpful and make 
use of them on occasion.  
 If I must ascribe a specific view to Strawson, however, I’d put my money on a 
combination of [17] and [36]. In other words, he holds onto an equal-status fundamental-duality 
monism where all things in reality are physical and all physical things are both experiential and 
non-experiential.  This implies that he is not a neutral monist and denies the possibility of 
emergence. Conveniently enough for my reading, he directly dismisses both.  
 On most days of the week, I think that Strawson is probably correct. However, I do not 
think that one needs to agree with him in order to be a panpsychist.  It should be fairly obvious 
that my ‘minimal panpsychism’ is essentially trying to capture [36] in more detailed form.  It is 
the closest anyone has come to pinning down the thesis that most panpsychists are striving 
towards.  The main difference between my view and his, then, is the commitment to physicalism.  
I have no specific hostility towards physicalism, but simply think it an unnecessary addition to 
panpsychism.  As covertly noted in a footnote already, I understand physicalism to include a ‘no 
fundamental mentality’ constraint.  This means that at the fundamental level of reality, there is 
nothing that resembles consciousness or mentality.  I do not claim that the position of 
physicalism necessarily holds this constraint, but instead think that most philosophers who argue 
for physicalism at least implicitly accept it.  It is simply a convenient and clear way of drawing 
the taxonomy.   
 
§ 2   Nagel 
Thomas Nagel does not often label himself with a position in any given area within philosophy.  
This is not some sign of weakness but the mark of a brilliant mind.  He, more so than most, fully 
appreciates just how difficult philosophical problems are and understands that certainty of 
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opinion is more often a sign of ineptitude than expertise. The strategy he favors is to argue for 
modest claims and only afterward attempt to understand where the arguments have led him.  
 Nagel’s approach toward panpsychism follows this general schema: he reaches it in a 
negative way by showing that it is the only thing left after one accepts a few basic positions.  By 
his rendering, panpsychism “appears to follow from a few simple premises, each of which is 
more plausible than its denial, though not perhaps more plausible than the denial of 
panpsychism.”30  They are the following: 
1. Material composition: no constituents besides matter are needed to compose a living 
organism. 
 
2. Nonreductionism: mental states are neither physical properties of an organism nor are 
they entailed by any physical properties.  
 
3. Realism: mental states are actual and real properties of an organism. 
 
4. Nonemergence: complex systems, such as an organism, do not have any truly emergent 
properties as emergence is only an epistemic principle of ignorance.  
 
Panpsychism, for Nagel, is the position that one arrives at when one accepts all four of these.  
This approach, I think, gives significant insight into how he understands it.  
 Nagel’s explanation of what opposition to reductionism entails is quite different from 
both Strawson’s and mine. He asserts that non-reductionism means mental states must be non-
physical, which is in obvious conflict with Strawson’s adherence to physicalism. The 
disagreement may only be superficial or terminological, however, depending upon what Nagel 
means by ‘physical’.  For my part, I do not think that one needs to put a dog in the ‘physicalism’ 
race in order to be a panpsychist. The key, instead, is to preserve non-reductionism in its purest 
form by holding both that mental or experiential phenomena cannot be reduced to non-
experiential phenomena and vice versa.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Nagel (1979), 181.  
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 Assuming that Nagel’s term ‘matter’ can refer to things that have both experiential and 
non-experiential qualities, then I have no problems with the rest of his theses.  Premise one can 
be derived directly from my view through the commitment to monism: nothing else but ‘matter’ 
is needed to compose living beings because there is nothing else that exists.  Premises three and 
four are captured by my symmetry thesis, as it both assumes experiential states to be real and 
directly implies a non-emergence thesis.  
 My only problem with Nagel’s position is that it doesn’t quite get him panpsychism.  As 
I’ve already argued, any real form of panpsychism needs something like my ubiquity thesis. To 
be fair, though, Nagel’s paper doesn’t seem to be arguing specifically that holding onto all four 
premises automatically forces one into panpsychism.  His point is much more subtle than that.  I 
understand his purpose as trying to show two things: first, that even though the premises appear 
to be incompatible with one another, there is a position available that can take account of them 
all; second that having the intuition that all four premises are true may lead one to eventually 
accept that panpsychism is true. Commitment to a full-blown panpsychism probably requires an 
additional psychological step.  
 
§ 3   Stoljar 
Daniel Stoljar has contributed a good deal to the understanding of what the position of 
‘physicalism’ entails and how it relates to similar views.  There is much of his work that is 
relevant to the project at hand, but I will limit the discussion to just one idea.  It is important 
because it explains precisely how I understand a key concept throughout the duration of the 
project.  As already briefly alluded to in footnote six of the first chapter, I mean the term 
‘physical’ to pick out several possibilities.  Because of the importance and frequent usage of the 
term, I will now explain Stoljar’s analysis in greater detail. 
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 The essential claim is that there are two distinct ways of conceiving of the ‘physical’. The 
first is the theory-based conception. It defines a physical property as: 
A property which either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about 
or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of 
property that physical theory tells us about.31  
 
The second way of viewing physical properties is with the object-based conception.  It defines 
them as: 
A property which either is the sort of property required by a complete account of 
the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else 
is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of 
property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic 
physical objects and their constituents.32 
  
The definitions are fairly straightforward, but their implications are not.   
 
 The distinction matters because whether or not a position is labeled as a physicalism 
could depend entirely upon which conception is assumed.  The prime example is the version of 
panpsychism that Galen Strawson endorses.  He labels it a physicalism presumably because he 
accepts the object-based conception as the correct way to understand which sorts of entities the 
position picks out.  Because he is a realist about experience, it is doubtful that his position would 
qualify as a physicalism given only the theory-based conception.  
 I do not bring up the distinction here to argue for one conception or the other.  My 
purpose is to present it as a tool of clarification.  I appeal to it in Chapter VI while attempting to 
understand the nature of the position that I develop.  
 
§ 4   Maxwell 
Grover Maxwell develops in the span of only a long essay an innovative position that he calls 
nonmaterialist physicalism.  It is a physicalism in the sense of the object-based conception of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Stoljar (2002), p. 313. 
32 Ibid, p. 313.  
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physical, evidenced by Maxwell’s statement that, “The physical is, very roughly, the subject 
matter of physics. By subject matter I mean not the theories, laws, principles, etc., of physics, but 
rather what the theories and laws are about.”33  It is also a mind-brain identity theory designed 
specifically with the purpose of avoiding Kripke’s criticisms.  As will become apparent through 
the course of this project, there are certain key parallels between Maxwell’s position and 
Russell’s, Strawson’s, and mine.  
 The first thing to note about Maxwell’s thesis is that he labels it a genuine mind-brain 
identity theory: 
A genuine mind-brain identity thesis must hold that there are both mental events 
and brain events, that all mental events are brain events, and that therefore some 
brain events are mental events ⎯ in the most full-blown “mentalistic” sense of 
‘mental’.34 
  
This is why Maxwell calls his view ‘nonmaterialist’.  He does not seek to reduce mental events 
to brain events and seems to think an attempt at doing so is not a true mind-brain identity thesis. 
The question remains, however, of how to conceptualize the implications of this view. 
 Maxwell begins with an observation that echoes Russell before him and Stoljar (among 
others) after him.  In Chapter IV, the discussion of Russell, I call it the ignorance principle.  It is 
the thesis that what the sciences, such as physics or neurophysiology, tell us about is merely the 
structural or dispositional properties of the things that compose the world.  If true, this means 
that neuroscience only explains the dispositional characteristics of brain events.  Maxwell then 
concludes that: 
The possibility is entirely open that some of these brain events just are our 
twinges of pain, our feelings of joy and sorrow, our thoughts that two plus two 
equals four, etc.  Such a brain event would of course, “share” all of its properties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Maxwell (1978), p. 341.  
34 Ibid, p. 349.  
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with the mental event which it is ⎯ all “essential” properties and all “accidental” 
properties, all intrinsic properties and all causal properties, etc., etc.35 
 
Since he also holds that we do know the intrinsic characteristic of our mental events, through 
acquaintance with them, then he sees the above conclusion as likely.  
 The remainder of Maxwell’s paper is an attempt to defend this thesis against a number of 
objections, one of course being the grain problem.  It is for this reason that he makes the field 
suggestion, which I develop in Chapter V. Before moving on, however, I wish to bring up a 
comment that Galen Strawson makes about Maxwell’s position.  Buried in a footnote near the 
end of his essay ‘Real Materialism’ is an offhand remark about the difficulty in naming his 
position.  He says, “It is hard to find satisfactory names, and Grover Maxwell, who holds 
essentially the same position as I do, calls himself a ‘nonmaterialist physicalist’.”36  I do not 
know exactly what to make of this comment, but have something to say about it in Chapter VI. 
For now, I will simply say that the connection between panpsychism and mind-brain identity 
theories may be more intricate than some might suppose.  
 
§ 5   Aristotle 
Aristotle was not a panpsychist.  Nor did he hold any of the other positions we talk about today 
when we discuss ‘philosophy of mind’.  The way he parsed up the world is too radically different 
from the post-Cartesian tradition we work in. To say his view matches perfectly or neatly with 
any current option is to be historically insensitive.  But this is not to say that Aristotle cannot be 
helpful.  On the contrary: 
The interpreter of Aristotle who wants to present his view as philosophically 
relevant today is obliged to take for granted the scientific advances of the last few 
centuries. But we are not obliged to take for granted the terms that have been 
imposed upon this new scientific knowledge by the post-Cartesian tradition of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid, p. 349.  
36 Strawson (2008), p. 51.  
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philosophical dualism and anti-dualism.  On the contrary, to do so seems to me to 
kill the philosophical relevance of Aristotle by eliminating his chief advantage, 
namely that he stands outside this post-Cartesian tradition, and hence that a 
sympathetic understanding of his position may allow us also to step outside this 
tradition long enough to subject it to critical scrutiny.37 
 
My inclusion of Aristotle in this project is directly related to the above quotation.  Part of the 
point in going the route of panpsychism is to find an alternative to the traditional views. I also 
wish to point out certain similarities between Aristotle and the position that Bertrand Russell 
develops, which is the topic of Chapter IV.  I will not go into detail here about Russell’s position, 
but instead beg the reader to recall the exposition here when dissecting the chapter devoted to it.  
 One aspect I wish to bring out concerning Aristotle, which is echoed in the later chapter 
on Russell, is the notion that ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ may not be as different as traditionally 
supposed.  Alternatively, it might also be the case that ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are conceived of in 
the wrong way. The panpsychist will probably hold that both are true.   
 The first thing I wish to discuss under this heading is the passive/active mind distinction. 
To understand this one must make note of how Aristotle conceives of ‘soul’, as the two subjects 
are intricately bound. In fact, the analysis of the mind is merely a sub-section in the overall 
analysis of the soul. In particular, the first/second actuality distinction is most relevant as it bears 
a striking resemblance to the passive/active mind distinction.   First actuality is defined as when 
one has knowledge of how to carry out a particular activity, whereas second actuality is when 
one actually performs said activity.  This distinction is used to define soul as, “an actuality or 
formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being besouled.”38  Soul, then, is 
not a metaphysical thing or object but instead the form of natural bodies that have achieved the 
first actuality of the potential to live.  It is fairly clear that he thinks of mind in a similar way with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Kahn (1992), 359. 
38 414a25-27. 
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the active/passive mind distinction.  Passive mind is when things are apprehended and thus the 
mind has the objects necessary for activity.  Active mind is the carrying out of said activity, 
meaning that it is also not a thing or object.   
 The obvious corollary here is with Russell’s notion of mental and physical ‘events’, 
which act as his replacement for mental and physical substances.  These are not objects or things 
in the ordinary sense, but are instead minute entities that have no structure in space-time.39 The 
point is to show that, as Russell argues, part of the problem may simply be that the categories of 
mind and matter are ill conceived.   
 One other point under this topic is the close relationship between mind and matter.  
Russell expresses doubt that mental and physical events are all that different, suggesting that 
many suffer from a failure of the imagination when they do not see how this could be the case.40  
Aristotle has this to say: 
If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted 
upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different but analogous to 
that.  The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of 
receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character 
with its object without being the object.  Mind must be related to what is 
thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.41 
 
The italicized section reveals exactly how similar physical and mental events are supposed to be.  
Though it may at first appear that the mind and objects in the world are clearly distinct, this may 
not be the case.  As Aristotle has just pointed out, the two need to be related in some 
fundamental way in order for them to interact.   
 The other aspect of Aristotelian philosophy I wish to bring out concerns the ubiquity 
principle.  It is this topic even more so than the last which can illustrate Aristotle’s relevance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Russell (1927), p. 286.  
40 Ibid, p. 384.  
41 429a15, emphasis mine.  
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The principle can at times be hard to grasp, so it is useful to delineate multiple formulations.  
How Aristotle discusses the idea can, I think, clarify exactly what is meant by it.  
 It is interesting to note that he arrives at something like the ubiquity principle as a 
consequence of the previous point. The argument is roughly the following: 
1. Mind must be related in some deep way to what is thinkable. 
 
2. Everything is a possible object of thought. 
 
3. If (2) is the case, then reality as a whole is the object of the mind.  In other words, all of 
reality is understandable by the mind.  
 
4. From (1) and (3), we see that active mind (the actual carrying out of mental activity) 
really amounts to the actual understandability of the world.  
 
This argument only works if one accepts Aristotle’s system, but it brings out an important idea.  
It provides an alternative way of conceiving of the idea that mental or experiential phenomena 
are ubiquitous at a low level of reality.  Taken in weak form, this could simply mean that all of 
reality has a nature such that it is understandable to our minds.  This fundamental 
understandability is a possible way to further explain the ubiquity principle, or to make it more 
palatable to some.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
Now that panpsychism and related positions have been discussed, it is time to explicate one of its 
major obstacles.  The subject of this chapter is the mind-dust objection as explained by both a 
contemporary and a philosopher at the turn of the century.  The problem does not end, however, 
with the issue as traditionally conceived.  I wish to make things even more difficult for the 
panpsychist by drawing out a corollary problem.  It is really just an aspect of the overall 
difficulty, but it should be made explicit.  
 The problem is essentially a conceptual one. It poses as an obstacle to both panpsychism 
and mind-brain identity theories, though I ignore the latter for present purposes.  One starts by 
noticing an implication of panpsychism, which is that our experiences are composed of smaller 
or micro-level experiences.  I will use the term ‘proto-experience’ to refer to these micro-
experiences which are supposed to somehow form into macro-experiences.  The difficulty that 
emerges was formulated by William James in the first volume of his The Principles of 
Psychology.  
 He states the problem eloquently in the following passage: 
If feelings can mix into a tertium quid, why do we not take a feeling of greenness 
and a feeling of redness, and make a feeling of yellowness out of them?  Why has 
optics neglected the open road to truth, and wasted centuries disputing about 
theories of color-composition which two minutes of introspection would have 
settled forever?  We cannot mix feelings as such, though we may mix the objects 
we feel, and from their mixture get new feelings. We cannot even have two 
feelings in our mind at once. At most we can compare together objects previously 
presented to us in distinct feelings; but then we find each object stubbornly 
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maintaining its separate identity before consciousness, whatever the verdict of the 
comparison may be.42 
 
The problem, then, is that experiences do not seem to sum in the way that panpsychism would 
seem to require.  As James argues, it is only objects and not experiences that can blend together.  
Moreover, he also holds that the mind can only be presented with one experience at a time and 
not a conglomeration of many. He also seems to conceive of experiences as individuated in a 
strong sense, meaning that they come one by one and are completely divided entities.43 
 Philip Goff, in a response article to Galen Strawson, calls upon the same objection to halt 
panpsychism. He puts the same idea the following way: 
The experiential being of BIG PAIN is supposed to be wholly constituted by the 
experiential being of all the LITTLE PAINS.  But to suppose that what it feels 
like to be BIG PAIN is wholly constituted by what it feels like to be all the 
LITTLE PAINS (if this comes to anything at all) must be to suppose that BIG 
PAIN feels how all the LITTLE PAINS feel and feels nothing else. But, by 
stipulation, this is not right. BIG PAIN feels a certain way that all the LITTLE 
PAINS do not: that is, severely pained.44 
 
Goff’s example brings out the same point as the passage from James, namely that each 
experience is unique.  Many small pains are just experienced as many small pains, not one big 
pain.  There is, though, another problem intricately bound with the first lurking behind the 
scenes. I now turn to it. 
 The idea is just this: experiences do not float alone out in the ether.  Talk of experiences 
seems to necessitate talk of subjects of experience.  The problem is that panpsychism seems to 
also hold that the human subject is composed of many smaller subjects of experience, or perhaps 
‘proto-subjects’. The same process as the one Goff describes with pains, little subjects 
combining to form big subjects, would need to take place in order for macro-level subjects to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 James (1890), pp. 157-158.  
43 At least this is what I assume he means by saying that experiences are “windowless” and “shut in their own skin”.  
See James (1890), p. 160.  
44 Goff (2006), p. 58. 
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form. There are several issues at work here.  The first is that this seems to radically overpopulate 
one’s ontology with subjects.  The second is that the notion of a ‘subject’ of experience becomes 
almost vacuous, mainly because it is difficult to see how electrons understood as ‘subjects’ could 
be anything like what we usually think of as a subject of experience, i.e. humans or animals. The 
third is that it seems inconceivable how many little subjects could somehow lend themselves or 
their information to a larger subject which they compose.  As an example, think of an extremely 
large crowd of people.  Though the crowd is composed of many little subjects, it seems 
counterintuitive to suppose that a new and larger subject is formed in the same way subjectivity 
happens in humans, even if one subscribes to a strong notion of group agency.  At the very least, 
it would seem as though we need to discern special laws for how this happens.  
 Before parting to the next section, I am compelled to address a possible attitude towards 
the objections just presented.  There is the chance that some will not be impressed with the 
objections and think they are not worthy of much attention.  This might lead one to dismiss them 
as simply a ‘failure of the imagination’ in the mind of an objector.  A dismissive attitude is 
perhaps due to the tendency on the part of adversaries to present them as a problem of the 
summation of simplistic experiences. There is, however, more to them than may at first meet the 
eye.  
 It might be that the examples provided by Goff and James can be dismissed by a response 
of the following form: “Just because you cannot conceive of how experiences can sum doesn’t 
mean that they cannot.”  If the panpsychist only had to show that the summation of billions or 
trillions of proto-experiences or proto-subjects produced human consciousness, then the problem 
wouldn’t be as powerful.  But human consciousness is not that simple.  It is usually taken to 
include many more things than brute sensations.  Intentionality, cognition, and the phenomenal 
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characteristics of both are all taken to be aspects of consciousness which the panpsychist, as a 
nonreductivist about such things, must take account of.  This is especially difficult if one takes 
these different aspects of consciousness to be a package deal, meaning consciousness only occurs 
when all are present. The panpsychist must be able to tell a story about how the experiential or 
proto-experiential being at a micro level forms the type of consciousness that we are most 
intricately aware of: our own.  If it is not possible to weave a narrative about how this happens, 
then one has no good reason to suspect that panpsychism is any closer to explaining 
consciousness than physicalism.   
 A substantial answer to the mind-dust objection, then, is needed.  It is indeed a 
conceptual problem(s), but this is no reason to think that it is trivial.  I do not have anything close 
to a definitive answer to either aspect of the issue, but instead try in the next two chapters to 
outline a possible way forward.  To begin building my case against them, I now turn to Bertrand 
Russell.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
The content of this chapter is largely historical in nature, though it serves a contemporary 
purpose.  It concerns a reinterpretation of the ‘neutral monism’ described by Bertrand Russell in 
a late chapter of The Analysis of Matter.  I contend that it can be understood as an epistemic 
thesis; a framework one may use to construct a reasonable metaphysic.  In addition to the overall 
understanding of Russell’s position, I also outline several specific facets of his philosophy.  They 
form the bones of the framework, and will mainly come into play during the next chapter.  It is 
there that I will make first steps toward a metaphysical project, as I use Russell’s position to 
support and help explain my version of panpsychism.   
 It is not a goal of this paper to argue that my reading of The Analysis of Matter best 
represents Russell’s actual position.  Nor is it to argue for the superiority of my interpretation 
over others.  It is instead an almost purely positive project.  I wish only to detail my 
interpretation and present it as a contemporary option.  The scholarly tasks of arguing against its 
competitors and for its accuracy are relegated to the future.   
 Before beginning, I must make note of the methodological technique that is most likely 
the reason why my reading of Russell is different than some others.  The thrust of my argument 
relies on Russell’s later understanding and discussion of his own work.  His later books Human 
Knowledge and My Philosophical Development provide clarification.  Russell’s own opinion was 
that much of his earlier work was misunderstood, and so sought to restate his views.  When two 
interpretative options are presented, I will tend to side with the one that best fits the later 
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restatements.  I have no elaborate defense of this method.  It is simply my (hopefully) reasonable 
belief that Russell better understood his own views than any interpreter could.  
 Russell began to shift away from dualism and towards a neutral monism several years 
before The Analysis of Matter was written.45  However, recent ‘Russellian monists’ draw their 
inspiration almost solely from it.  This is no accident.  The work contains the most detailed 
analysis of it that Russell provided, along with how it helps one to understand the connection 
between physics and perception.  Most of my analysis will therefore focus on it, and especially 
the later chapter entitled ‘Physics and Neutral Monism’.  As already noted, I will sometimes seek 
advice from the later Russell when the fog of vagueness settles.  
  There are a couple of key features to point out that should, taken together, provide ample 
evidence for my reading.  These include: the event ontology, the notion of ‘compresence’, what I 
call the ‘ignorance’ principle, and the lack of an act/object distinction.   They are discussed in 
turn. 
 
§ 1   Events 
Throughout The Analysis of Matter, Russell dispenses with talk of ‘substance’ and ‘matter’.  He 
finds that current scientific understanding suggests that these concepts, which were once thought 
to be fundamental, are now analyzable into more basic terms.  The analysis shows, at least 
Russell thinks, that these more basic constituents are ‘events’.  
 Some unpacking of this view must now be done, though its relevance will only appear at 
the conclusion.  First, it must be noted that ‘events’ take on the role of ‘particulars’ in Russell’s 
analysis.  Particulars are defined as: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Russell notes in My Philosophical Development that this major change in thinking happened around the time he 
gave the lectures on logical atomism, or about 1918.  See Russell (1959), p. 134.  
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the ultimate terms of the physical structure – ultimate, I mean, in relation to the 
whole of our present knowledge.  A “particular”, that is to say, will be something 
which is concerned in the physical world merely through its qualities or its 
relations to other things, never through its own structure, if any.46 
 
One important aspect of this definition should be made explicit.  Particulars, the “ultimate 
terms”, are given a relativistic definition.  Though Russell may consider events to be the most 
basic terms by which current physics can be analyzed in, he is here admitting that they may not 
actually be the ultimate terms.  Given further scientific progression, we may learn that talk of 
events may be analyzable into simpler terms.  
 What, though, are these ‘events’ which are supposed to be particulars?   In the chapter 
‘Particulars and Events’, Russell tells us that: 
I shall therefore assume henceforth that the physical world is to be constructed out 
of “events”, by which I mean practically entities or structures occupying a region 
of space-time which is small in all four dimensions. “Events” may have a 
structure, but it is convenient to use the word “event”, in the strict sense, to mean 
something which, if it has a structure, has no space-time structure, i.e. it does not 
have parts which are external to each other in space-time.47  
 
‘Events’, then, are meant to be the most minute bits into which space-time can be broken into.  
For reasons to come later, it is important to reiterate a key feature of the definition.  Russell 
leaves open the possibility that these minute ‘events’ have a complex structure, so long as the 
parts are not distinct in space-time.  
 The picture, so far, is that physical reality may be analyzed down to particulars that are 
admittedly relative to current scientific understanding.  The particulars of modern physics, it 
seems, are discrete events in space-time instead of ‘substances’ or ‘things’.  How, though, does 
this help us resolve the mind/body problem?  Russell speaks in many places of both ‘mental’ and 
‘physical’ events, not hinting that the mental events could be reduced to physical ones.  We turn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Russell (1928), 277.  
47 Ibid, 286.  
	   	   	  33 
now to the notion of compresence to see how mental events can find a place in the physical 
world.  
 
§ 2   Compresence 
Compresence is initially defined as a relation that two or more events may have with one 
another.  Two or more events are compresent if they overlap in space-time.48  Russell sees this 
notion as a way to give mental events presence in space-time, and therefore causal efficacy.  If 
mental events can be compresent with physical events, then they have a place in the order of 
space-time.  If they have this, then they may also factor into the causal lines that run through 
reality.  
 The first important note made is that the compresence of mental and physical events is 
not meant to apply to percepts and pieces of matter.  If one understands ‘physical event’ to 
roughly equate to ‘matter’, then Russell’s assertion will seem inconceivable. But the age-old 
conception of matter as impenetrable and indestructible is absent in his take.  This is because, for 
Russell, pieces of matter are merely logical constructions composed of physical events.49 The 
relation of compresence, then, is meant only to apply to percepts and physical events.   
 There still might seem to be something odd in the idea of mental and physical 
overlapping in space-time even when cast in terms of events instead of substances.  We may see 
upon evaluation, however, that this intuition is unwarranted. It might turn out that the line 
between mind and body is not so clear.  I now turn to what I call Russell’s ‘ignorance principle’ 
to show how this might be.  
 
§ 3   The Ignorance Principle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid, 294.  
49 Ibid, 384.  
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The topic of this section has been discussed in contemporary literature much more so than the 
previous two.  Most who label their position ‘inspired’ by Russell focus upon it.  I call it the 
ignorance principle, and will offer a cursory definition followed by specifics from Russell.  It is 
essentially the claim that we are either completely or almost completely ignorant of the intrinsic 
nature of the physical world.  Physics, in this line of reasoning, only describes structural or 
dispositional properties.  The ‘categorical basis’ or intrinsic nature of the entities that have the 
dispositional properties physics describes is hidden from us.50 
 How exactly, though, does Russell arrive at this position? I find the clearest statement to 
be the following: 
A piece of matter is a logical structure composed of events; the causal laws of the 
events concerned, and the abstract logical properties of their spatio-temporal 
relations, are more or less known, but their intrinsic character is not known. 
Percepts fit into the same causal scheme as physical events, and are not known to 
have any intrinsic character which physical events cannot have, since we do not 
know of any intrinsic character which could be incompatible with the logical 
properties that physics assigns to physical events. There is therefore no ground for 
the view that percepts cannot be physical events, or for supposing that they are 
never compresent with other physical events.51 
 
It is important to keep in mind the topics of the last two sections when trying to understand this 
position.  Since Russell casts it in terms of compresent events, one must be careful not to slip 
into talk of ‘objects’ or ‘substance’ in order to give an accurate portrayal.  One may, of course, 
utilize the main idea in one’s own metaphysic, but it is not abundantly clear that it can hold 
ground outside of Russell’s system.  In any case, I will attempt to understand the position using 
Russell’s terms.  
 I take the crucial aspects of the ignorance principle to be: 
1. Matter is not a concrete entity, but is instead a logical construction that is really 
compresent events in some given region of space-time. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See, for example, Stoljar (2002, 2006, 2010), Strawson (2006), and Chalmers (2010).  
51 Russell (1927), 384.  
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2. We are so far unaware of the intrinsic nature of the events which compose the physical 
world. 
 
3. Mental events are part of the world’s causal schema. 
 
 
4. We have no good reason to suppose that it is impossible for some mental events, namely 
perceptions, to be physical. 
 
5. We also have no good reason to suppose that mental events cannot be compresent with 
physical events. 
 
Let me be clear about what I think this is not saying.  It is not claiming that the nature of physical 
events is not discoverable in principle.  There is at least the possibility, within Russell’s system, 
that we could come to know the nature of physical events by description.52 
 The important thing to point out about this principle is that it does not force us into one 
specific kind of position.  It is instead pointing out places where our knowledge is lacking.  In 
doing so, it also hints at possible avenues to pursue that diverge from the traditional categories of 
materialism and dualism.53  The subject of the next chapter will serve as an example of one such 
possibility. 
 
§ 4   The Act/Object Distinction 
There is an assumption working in the background of The Analysis of Matter that deserves to be 
acknowledged.  It will not factor much into the discussion of the current chapter but will be 
important later on. As I have already noted, Russell was a dualist until sometime around 1918.  
What began the shift towards monism is that he gave up the act/object distinction.  In other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Here I am referring to the technical notion, knowledge by description, which Russell develops as part of his 
epistemology.  
53 For an alternative and much more thorough discussion of the ignorance principle, see Stoljar (2006a), pp. 112-
116.  
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words, he ended up agreeing with William James that there is no deep or metaphysical 
distinction between the subject and object.54   
 Instead, the subject becomes something like a logical construction or fiction in the same 
way that matter does.  Russell’s take is that: 
It [the subject] is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is 
linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar. Nominal entities 
of this sort may or may not exist, but there is no good ground for assuming that 
they do.55 
 
This passage shows that Russell’s attitude towards the existence of the subject is similar to the 
one expressed concerning the relation of mental and physical events.  He is not definitively 
denying the existence of the subject, for he clearly leaves open the possibility that it really does 
exist.  And it may be possible that it can be proven to exist in the future.  The point is yet another 
one of epistemic humility: we shouldn’t assume either way without good reason. In the absence 
of good reasons, he parsimoniously sides with the non-existence of a separate subject. 
 Russell realized fairly quickly that giving up the distinction required him to re-work 
much of his philosophy.  For example, it required him to abandon the notions of ‘sense-data’ and 
‘knowledge by acquaintance’.  He also realized that the relationship between perception and 
physics described in The Problems of Philosophy and Our Knowledge of the External World 
needed to be reconceived.  This realization is, I think, at least partly responsible for his writing of 
The Analysis of Matter.56  There is decent reason to think, then, that the position outlined in said 
book can be read as including a rejection of the independent existence of subjects.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See Russell (1956), pp. 134-144 for his own account of this progression. In addition, the preface to the 1929 
edition of Our Knowledge of the External World acknowledges the same thing: Russell is here informing the reader 
of the major changes between the 1914 and 1929 versions. He states that, “The only philosophical change in the 
present edition is the abandonment of the distinction between sensations and sense-data, which I now agree with the 
American realists in regarding as illusory.” See Russell (1914/1929), p. vii.  
55 Ibid, pp. 135-136.  
56 I should note that the dates of the referenced works are able to support this conclusion.  The Problems of 
Philosophy was published in 1912 and Our Knowledge of the External World was originally a series of lectures 
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§ 5   The Epistemic Reading 
How are we to understand the position Russell is laying out? Why does he refer to it as a ‘neutral 
monism’? Is it a metaphysical or epistemic thesis?  I will attempt to answer these questions in the 
present section.  First, however, it must be noted that what I have provided is far from a 
comprehensive study. I have only picked out the aspects of Russell’s view that I take to be the 
essential pieces for my purpose. Once again, though, the goal is not a precise historical analysis.  
I simply wish to provide an alternative way of understanding Russell’s position while of course 
remaining as accurate as possible.  
 I propose to understand Russell’s ‘neutral monism’ as an epistemic thesis concerning 
what we know about mind and matter.57  ‘Neutral’, in this reading, does not refer to any 
metaphysical property of neutrality possessed by the events that compose the world.  The focus 
is not upon how events are in and of themselves.  It is instead upon how we come to know of 
them.  For Russell, it seems to be the case that the division between physical and mental as 
ordinarily conceived just is determined by how we come to know of them.  How he defines them 
in Human Knowledge is telling: 
Let us first define more exactly what we mean by a “physical” event.  I should 
define it as an event which, if known to occur, is inferred, and which is not known 
to be mental.  And I define a “mental” event as one with which some one is 
acquainted otherwise than by inference.58 
 
The difference between mental and physical, then, is merely an epistemic one based upon the 
different ways we come to learn of events.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
given in 1914.  As already stated, Russell gave up the act/object distinction around 1918.  The Analysis of Matter 
was not published until 1927, leaving plenty of time for any residual sympathies towards the distinction to disappear 
from his mind.   
57 Stoljar (2006a) arrives at a similar position, though he makes quite different use of it.  
58 Russell (1948), p. 202.  
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 The notion of ‘neutrality’, then, is not making a claim as to the intrinsic nature of the 
events that compose the world.  It is simply that the notion of an ‘event’ can be understood 
independently of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’.  The actual metaphysical structure of the world is 
another question entirely.  Remembering the ignorance principle, we see that experience does not 
make the true natures of events easily known to us.  This information, however, might be 
discoverable through careful analysis.  Many different positions are compatible with an 
epistemic neutral monism.  For instance, one could be a metaphysical idealist while maintaining 
epistemic neutral monism.  This would basically claim that experience only shows us that some 
events are mental and some are physical, so we can treat them as two different types of the same 
thing.  The idealist would then make the further claim that we can also learn through doing 
philosophy that all the events composing the world are ultimately mental in nature.  
 As for Russell himself, there is decent textual evidence to suggest that he thought a 
physicalist mind-brain identity theory was most likely the default stance.59 Although I will not 
weigh in on the historical debate concerning Russell’s position, I bring up this point for a reason.  
Recalling the section on the ignorance principle, Russell clearly acknowledges the possibility 
that mental events just are physical events.  If this were the case, then the view would qualify as 
a kind of identity theory.  As I have already hinted at in the section covering Grover Maxwell, 
the difference between identity theory and panpsychism is not clear.  Part of Chapter V will deal 
with this question, as I try to understand the nature of the position that I develop.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Thanks go to Donovan Wishon for bringing this to my attention.  See, for instance, Russell’s discussion of 
William James in his History of Western Philosophy.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
The present chapter applies glue to the so far disparate pieces.  The resultant position is only a 
sketch, an outlining of a possible avenue.  It combines the insights from the second chapter with 
the Russellian account developed in the last, all in an effort to suggest a way around the mind-
dust objection.  The development has been admittedly tedious.  My hope is that the work here 
will render it worthwhile. 
 The first section outlines in more detail Maxwell’s proposal, combined with a short 
discussion of how I understand ‘fields’.  The second section applies the suggestion to 
panpsychism.  The third then uses it to build upon the Russellian framework described in the last 
chapter. The fourth section gives reasons for thinking that the approach circumvents the mind-
dust objection.  A new version of panpsychism is briefly outlined in the fifth section as an 
attempt to tie everything together.  The chapter, and entire project, concludes with a brief recap 
of the main aspects of the outlined position.  
 
§ 1   Fields? 
Grover Maxwell’s purpose in writing ‘Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity’ was to defend 
a version of identity theory, which was immune to Kripke’s criticisms.  Along the way he 
defends it against various other possible objections.  One of these is the ‘grain’ problem, which is 
just the identity theorist’s equivalent of the mind-dust objection: how is it that the billions of 
neurons in the brain can produce conscious experience that is smooth and not fragmented in the 
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way the brain itself is?  Maxwell’s suggestion is to say that the problem may be with assuming 
that conscious experience must be identified with neuronal activity.  It may instead be the case 
that some other physical phenomenon in the brain is a more apt mechanism for identification 
with individual conscious experiences.  
 The notion Maxwell entertains as a possibility is admittedly fanciful, but he is justified in 
making it.  He has at this point in the paper already made clear his alignment with Russell’s 
ignorance principle, or at least the thought that leads to it.  Essentially, our imaginative picture of 
matter and the physical world is profoundly elementary.  His remedy is the following: 
In sum, as our knowledge grows about the various manifolds of events that 
constitute the physical realm, perhaps we shall discover that some of the 
structures that are exemplified by them are entirely isomorphic and quite possibly 
identical with instances of the structures with which we are acquainted in our 
“private” experience.  Even within the bounds of present physical theory, we 
might consider a fanciful but logically coherent possibility. Fields ⎯ electrical, 
magnetic, or gravitational ⎯ and fluctuations in fields are, as far as their 
structures are concerned, viable candidates for identification with (some kinds of) 
mental states or mental events.60   
 
Maxwell’s purpose is obviously to entertain the idea that the structure of mental events is such 
that physical fields could be what they are identical with in the material world.  The understated 
idea is what I wish to emphasize: it is possible to think of mental events as behaving in a manner 
similar to physical fields.  
 My proposal to the panpsychist is therefore simple.  Why not think of experiential or 
proto-experiential being at the micro level as a type of field?  More specifically, why not think of 
experiential being behaving in the same way as a gravitational field (at least as far as relativistic 
physics is concerned)?  There are of course other ways of understanding how this might work, 
but I merely want to offer a specific suggestion.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Maxwell (1978), p. 351. Emphasis added.  
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 One thing I wish to be clear about is that my project differs from Maxwell’s in at least 
one crucial respect.  While he is seeking a way to identify mental events with a certain type of 
physical phenomena, the panpsychist has no need for this identification.  Panpsychism, as a 
monism, certainly needs to be compatible with physics, but this is far from saying that 
experiential being must be tied to one specific physical phenomenon.  
 Before detailing how my suggestion works with respect to panpsychism, I will give a 
quick discussion of how I wish the notion of ‘fields’ to be understood. As already stated, the 
specific method will be to consider proto-experiential being at the micro level to behave in a 
similar fashion to gravitational fields as elementary relativistic physics describes them.  One is 
likely to encounter the following thought experiment in many non-technical popular physics 
books.  
 Imagine space-time as a thin sheet of some elastic material.  When a heavy object is 
placed on the sheet, an indentation is formed around it.  If smaller and lighter objects are then 
rolled near the heavy object, they will fall toward it due to the indentation.  Gravity acts on the 
large scale in a similar way as the indentation in the fabric caused by a heavy object.  Large and 
heavy objects, such as the Sun, create an indentation in the fabric of space-time.  This 
indentation, or curvature, of space-time is the gravitational force which causes smaller objects 
like planets to orbit or fall towards larger ones.  
 It is difficult to pin down exactly what a ‘field’ is supposed to be.  I shy away from 
technical definitions because they are usually presented in terms of physical theory.  It also may 
distract from the main point, which is not to present a technical theory of exactly how 
experiential being exists at the micro level.   
 
§ 2   Experiential Fields 
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How exactly can the gravitational field suggestion be applied to panpsychism?  The essential 
picture is to think of experiential being at the micro-level as something akin to the sheet of 
elastic material representing space-time.  This is experiential being at its most minimal level.61  It 
is then that elementary physical particles are taken into account.  Physical entities create 
indentions in this experiential fabric, which warps experiential being into a field surrounding the 
entities.  This is perhaps what could give the physical entities their intrinsic nature.  The 
emphasis, however, is on the idea that experiential being at this level (whatever its nature) is 
more like gravity than particles.  
 Something more must be said of exactly how to combine this fanciful notion with 
panpsychism.  To do so, I will in turn treat each of the three theses I described as the minimal 
commitments for panpsychism.  The first question to entertain, then, is: is this position a 
monism? 
 My proposition is to treat this view as a version of ‘both’ monism, which Strawson labels 
‘equal status fundamental duality monism’.62  This is essentially the idea that reality is composed 
of only one fundamental type of stuff.  The ‘stuff’ is then said to have a dual nature, in this case 
both experiential and non-experiential.  The reason is that this position kills two metaphysical 
birds with one stone. 
 The ‘both’ monism may strike some as a dualism masquerading as monism. It is true that 
the duality between the experiential and the non-experiential will be fundamental, but there is no 
reason to think that they represent separate substances.  If parsimony is to prevail, it seems more 
likely that the fundamental stuff or substance underlying all reality simply has two distinct 
aspects.  At the same time, the commitment to a ‘both’ monism can also ensure that the principle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 It might be the case that the version of the ubiquity principle I drew from Aristotle could be used to explain this 
most minimal level.  
62 Strawson (2006b), p. 223.  
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of symmetry is maintained.  The both monism is able to hold that at the most fundamental level 
where either experiential or non-experiential being obtains, there is a symmetrical relationship 
between the two.   
 The field version of panpsychism also conceives of the ubiquity principle in a novel way.  
Instead of thinking of experiential being as particles or some other ‘object’, it is instead viewed 
in a way similar to how physical science views space itself.  Though some might think of ‘space’ 
as an abstract concept, modern physics details how the fabric of space has a real influence upon 
physical entities.  Conceiving of it in this way therefore in no way diminishes the causal efficacy 
of the experiential or diminishes its place in the metaphysical schema.  
 
§ 3   Russell Round Two 
The portrait of reality just explicated is admittedly speculative.  Speculation, however, might be 
exactly what is needed for solving a deep conceptual problem.  There is still more to add to the 
picture to bring it slightly back down to Earth.  Several of the concepts discussed in the previous 
chapter on Bertrand Russell now come into play.  
 It should be obvious that the project is inspired by Russell’s ignorance principle and 
makes thorough use of it.  Specifically it takes to heart the suggestion that part of the problem is 
thinking of the things that compose the world as ‘matter’ or billiard ball style little bits.  It is 
difficult to see how a field of experiential being could interact with matter as traditionally 
conceived even if they are composed of the same stuff.  It might be best, then, to hold that matter 
is not a solid, indestructible, and impenetrable substance. 
 Instead, the matter, which makes up concrete reality is composed of events.  Russell’s 
definition of ‘event’ is purposefully vague, as he does not wish to posit which entities count as 
events.  The motivation is to keep the analysis of physics adaptable.  In proposing a metaphysical 
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structure for how to understand experiential being, however, the need to stay adaptable to current 
physical theories is not as important.  I propose, then, that a way of understanding the 
experiential fields is to think of them as events in Russell’s sense of the term.  It could be that 
this is the ultimate differentiation between mental and physical events: when the ‘stuff’ of the 
world behaves as a field it exhibits its experiential quality, whereas when it behaves as a particle 
it exhibits its non-experiential quality.  The description of a field also blends well with the 
definition of events, as fields do not suffer from the fatal flaw that the antiquated conception of 
matter does.  Fields are not immutable, impenetrable, solid entities.  There is a certain intangible 
aspect to them, though they nonetheless influence the physical world.   
 It might be objected that Russell’s definition of events as non-structural particulars does 
not match well with the dual nature inherent in ‘both’ monism.  But this is to forget that while 
events do not have a structure in space-time, Russell leaves room for them having a structure of 
the nature posited here.  That is because the structure of events for the field panpsychist is one of 
metaphysical intrinsic natures, not extrinsic spatio-temporal ones.  
 Once something like Russell’s events are added to the picture, the door is opened for 
another aspect of his system.  There is always the question of how the individual experiential 
fields interact.  Physical theory has its own version of what happens when two curvatures in 
space-time meet, so there should be a corollary for the field panpsychist.  The notion of 
compresence might fill the gap.  
 Since fields are posited as events, then following Russell, it is possible for them to be 
compresent.  In other words, they may overlap in space-time.  What this would amount to is up 
for debate, but it is conceivable that the result of two fields being compresent is an intensification 
of the fields.  Take, for example, a corollary situation in physical theory.  A star roughly the size 
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of our sun causes a fairly large indentation in space-time, resulting in a decently strong 
gravitational field.  If another star is added in the near vicinity, creating a binary star system, the 
resultant gravitational field becomes much stronger.  In the next section, I propose that this is the 
key point in understanding how the field approach might solve the mind-dust objection. 
 
§ 4   Mind-Dust Again 
As a quick refresher, the first problem associated with the mind-dust objection concerns the 
summation of experiences.  It is difficult to conceptualize how, as Goff noted, many ‘little’ pains 
could sum to form one ‘big’ pain.  There is an alternative way of conceiving of this summation 
that must be made explicit, however.  
 Yesterday morning, I woke up with a sore neck from sleeping in an awkward position.  
Shortly afterwards I banged my foot climbing into the shower.  It was indeed possible for me to 
view these two separate pains as individual experiences in the way that Goff and James describe.  
After concentrating more, however, I realized that I was not able to individuate the pains as 
clearly as originally supposed.  It certainly was not the case that the two ‘little’ pains summed to 
form some bigger ‘pain’ in the way Goff describes.  But the separation of the two was also not 
clear.  What seemed more accurate was that the presence of two separate pains merely intensified 
the sensation of pain itself.63 
 The proposal, then, is that experiences cannot and do not ‘sum’ because they are not as 
clearly individuated as ordinary objects.  Instead, two similar experiences can blend with one 
another and intensify (or possibly cancel out).  This is exactly how the compresence of two or 
more experiential field events would work.  They are able to sum in a way that panpsychism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Recent work in experimental philosophy suggests that how people individuate intentional actions depends upon 
extraneous factors, such as moral valence. It might be the case that the individuation of experiences suffers from a 
similar phenomenon.  If this is indeed the case, then the borders between experiences may not be as clear as many 
suppose.  See, for an example of experiments done on act individuation, Ulatowski (2012), pp. 249-262.  
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requires, but not in a way that seems inconceivable. This conceptual framework hopefully 
alleviates some of the worries with how experiences are supposed to sum.   
 There is still, however, the problem concerning the subjects of experiences.  There are 
perhaps multiple ways to go on this issue.  Galen Strawson, for one, appeals to the notion of ‘thin 
subjects’: 
This is not to commit oneself to any view about the ontological status of the 
necessarily existing subject. It is certainly not to commit oneself to the idea that it 
must be a substance in any conventional sense of the word, i.e. any sense in which 
a substance is understood to be something that stands in fundamental ontological 
contrast with a property.  One can be certain that an experience is impossible 
without an experiencer while knowing nothing more than Descartes knows in his 
Second Meditation when he says ‘I know I exist; the question is, what is this “I” 
that I know?’.64 
 
The appeal to ignorance (in the Russellian sense) is apparent.  The claim is that it seems 
ridiculous for us to assume the problem of subjects is actually a problem since we have no idea 
what a subject of experience is.  This is certainly an appeal that one can make, but there is 
another possible avenue to pursue. 
 The main issue with Strawson’s method is that it gets us nowhere closer to actually 
solving the problem, assuming it really is one.  My proposal is even more Russellian in nature.  
Why should we not simply give up the act/object distinction to do away with the problem?  In 
other words, if we deny that there is a real difference between the experience and the 
experiencer, then the issue loses much of its force.   
 The suggestion is admittedly radical, but it does away with an important objection.  One 
does not need to worry about the nature of micro-subjects when there is no actual distinction 
between them and micro-experiences.  In this way, the problem of subject summation collapses 
back into the original problem of experiential summation.  I do not pretend to have fully thought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Strawson (2006b), p. 190.  
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through the consequences of this radical move, but merely offer it as a possible solution.  It is 
possible that giving up the act/object distinction would allow one to meld the metaphysical field 
panpsychist thesis with Russell’s epistemic system presented in Human Knowledge.  If this is so, 
then there is indeed a way of maintaining many of Russell’s positions while at the same time 
offering a re-conception of the structure of reality.  This may be only wishful thinking, but I see 
no obvious reason for why it could not work.  
 
§ 5   Panqualiaism 
The end of chapter III lamented that many probably do not see the mind-dust objection as a 
serious issue, and gave reasons for doubting this blasé attitude.  The question is how simplistic 
proto-experiences, assuming they can combine in some way, can end up proliferating into the 
vastly complex consciousness that humans are familiar with.  The suggestion for how to 
approach this issue is perhaps even more fanciful than the field approach, though it might follow 
from it.   
 The solution may be to accept that some aspects of human consciousness are not 
fundamental.  In fact, one may need to posit only one facet of consciousness or mentality that 
exists at all levels.  From this one fundamental aspect of experiential states, all the others will 
somehow arise either from it or in response to it. Why would one possibly go in this direction?  
Because it is intuitively plausible that experiential being at a micro-level is simple in the same 
way that microphysical entities are.  Consider quarks as an example.  These tiny particles are 
even smaller than the protons and neutrons which make up the nuclei of atoms.  They are only 
distinguished by a single property, their spin.  Some spin upwards and some spin downwards. It 
is conceivable that the properties held by micro-experiential fields (or however one conceives of 
the micro-experiential) need to be as simplistic. 
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 Human consciousness, however, is not simplistic.  It seems deeply suspicious to suggest 
that tiny experiential fields also have many facets, such as intentionality and subjectivity. Many 
writing in the panpsychism literature have recognized this point.  The appeal usually made is to 
‘panprotopsychism’, with ‘proto-experiences’ usually defined as being experiential in character 
without actually being full-blown experiences.  It is difficult to hold this position and not have it 
collapse into strict physicalism without positing the nature of the proto-experiences.  My purpose 
in this section is to offer a suggestion as to their nature, as it is probably the case that the field 
approach qualifies as a type of panprotopsychism (though I am not sure that the distinction is an 
important one). 
 The proposition is simply that the experiential character inherent within the ‘stuff’ of the 
universe is essentially qualitative.  To put it another way, the stuff that composes all of reality is 
taken to have a qualitative nature in and of itself.  The qualities of physical entities, then, are not 
qualities relative to other physical entities.  They are absolute, ontologically foundational 
qualities.  Qualia, or something near enough, are therefore taken to be the intrinsic experiential or 
mental characteristics of concrete reality.  I will call this position, for complete lack of anything 
better, panqualiaism.  
 If one accepts this view, then there is a possibility of explaining why it is that conscious 
experiences are qualitative.  Maxwell’s identity theory, for one, holds that some brain events are 
essentially mental in character.  Brain events specifically associated with conscious activity 
would most likely be the prime candidate.  There is always the question for the true identity 
theorist, however, of why it is the case that some brain events have a qualitative nature.  The 
foundation provided by panqualiaism might be able to suggest that what makes consciousness 
unique is that it taps into the qualitative nature of reality itself.  With enough complexity, such as 
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that provided by our brains, organisms are able to access the qualitative nature of the world.  The 
brain might be viewed as an interpreter or approximation engine of the qualities found in 
ordinary objects.  The suggestion sounds strange, like something out of a fairy-tale, but is at least 
a coherent possibility.  
 It is my hope that panqualiaism might be looked upon as a possible metaphysical 
structure with which to unite all of the various pieces presented here.  It is a monism of the ‘both’ 
variety and preserves both the symmetry and ubiquity principles.  Therefore, it minimally 
qualifies as a version of panpsychism.  It additionally adds to the field approach by supplying a 
way of understanding what exactly the micro-level fields of experience are like.  The fields 
would be something like the expression of reality’s true intrinsic qualitative-ness. In less 
confusing terms, the experiential being that pervades reality at the micro-level is nothing more 
than the actual intrinsic quality of reality itself.   
 
§ 6   In Summary 
At the end of a long tale, it is beneficial to take stock of what has happened since specifics are 
bound to be forgotten along the way.  The story began with an analysis of what the position 
known as panpsychism is actually committed to.  It is first committed to monism, the idea that if 
one ventures far enough down the chain of levels in reality, one will eventually reach a level 
where every concretely existing thing is of only one type.  It is secondly committed to a 
symmetry principle, meaning that neither the experiential nor the non-experiential can be 
explained in terms of the other.  The third commitment is to a principle of ubiquity, such that 
experiential being pervades the world at some level.  
 The antagonist to the story was the mind-dust objection in all of its various forms. To aid 
in the defeat of this foe, the work of Bertrand Russell was called into action.  The notions of 
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events and compresence were taken from the work and explicated.  The ignorance principle, 
which is a founding feature of many (if not all) versions of panpsychism, was also briefly 
sketched.   
 The plot twist was a re-conceptualization of how experiential being exists at the micro-
level.  It might be that, instead of discrete entities like atoms, proto-experience exists in field 
form.  The argument was that fields nicely fit into Russell’s definition of ‘event’, meaning that 
they could also be compresent.  The compresence of field-like events was then presented as how 
experiences could ‘sum’, as it is not so much summation as intensification. It was also suggested 
that another of Russell’s ideas be borrowed for solving the problem of micro-subjects.  If one 
simply gives up the act/object distinction, the conceptual difficulty appears less insurmountable.  
 The story’s final plot turn was the proposal of a novel view to tie everything together.  
This ‘panqualiaism’ establishes a new way to view panpsychism, while at the same time 
allowing for the field approach to work.  It also offers up a new way of looking at the ontological 
structure of reality. Whether or not it is ultimately a viable option is an open question.  It was 
never a goal of this project to decide which view was most likely.  The end result of the tale, if 
there is one, is the establishment of an alternative conceptual scheme that sits outside the 
mainstream.  I consider it successful if it does nothing more than show which approach not to 
take.  I cannot at this point, however, pronounce the end to the story.  As is always the case in 
philosophy, future investigation is needed.  
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